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Resumen: Este trabajo profundiza en el concepto de paridad inter-
nacional de las tasas de interés, cuyo análisis en nuestro 
medio ha estado limitado al diferencial de tasas 
nominales de interés, ajustado por la devaluación. Dicho 
diferencial nominal sólo se aproximaría al real en la 
medida en que se hubiese mantenido la regla de paridad 
del poder adquisitivo, lo cual no ha ocurrido en todo 
momento. 
Abstract: The concept of interest rate parity is here revisited, 
emphasizing the different results that are obtained when 
the analysis is made either using a nominal interest rate 
difference, adjusted by the actual or expected rate of 
depreciation, or using a real interest rate difference. The 
results vary according to deviations from "purchasing 
power parity". 
ntroduction 
•uring the 1980s, analytical efforts were made to distinguish between 
ominal determinants of the interest rates (i.e. to isolate the inflation 
ffect) from its real determinants (i.e. components of the cost of use of 
ipital). For example, in the case of Colombia, Olivera (1993) found that 
hile nominal interest rates had descended from an average of 35% to 
1% per annum in the period 1980-1991/1992-1993, the cost of use of 
* The author is indebted to A. Carrasquilla for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
;sponsibility for opinions and remaining errors rests only with the author and do not 
cessarily represent the points of view of the Colombian Government. 
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capital had been reduced from 30% to nearly 13% per annum. The driving 
force in the reduction of the nominal interest rate was the deceleration of 
inflation, which fell from an average of 29.8% per annum during 1990¬
1992 to 22.4% during 1993. The dramatic reduction in the cost of use of 
capital had to do with the liberalization of trade, which implied both the 
abolition of most quantitative restrictions levied on imported goods and 
the reduction of effective tariffs from an average of nearly 75% in 1989 
to 7% in 1993 (including the abolition of the surcharge). The reduction 
in the cost of use of capital was further reinforced by the creation of tax 
incentives in the imports of capital goods. 
Additionally, it has become important to distinguish between inter-
nal and external components of the interest rate differentials. External 
components are usually approximated by compounding the effect of 
external interest rates with the actual or the expected rate of deprecia-
tion of the peso against the dollar. This kind of analysis has empirical 
support in the findings that internal interest rates are influenced by the 
nominal interest rate parity condition. In fact, Edwards (1984) conclud-
ed that the Colombian economy could be characterized as a "small and 
semiopen economy" during the 1970s and early 1980s due to such 
influence of the external return on the domestic interest rates. Clavijo 
(1986) and Herrera (1990), among others, corroborated such findings, 
in spite of the presence of a rigid system of exchange controls instituted in 
1967. Additionally, Correa (1992) found, using an error correction mo-
del, that causality runs fundamentally from the external to the internal 
rate of return. 
Since the liberalization of the Colombian economy, in early 1990, it 
has become more apparent the role of the external returns in determin-
ing the domestic interest rates. Law 9 of 1991 dismounted many of the 
exchange controls, including the obligation of surrendering to the Cen-
tral Bank proceeds from all exports, and also abolished the imposition 
of strict limits for contracting foreign debt. These deregulations have 
been complemented by Resolutions 57/91, 21/93, 28/93 and 2/94 of the 
Central Bank by which the traditional crawling-peg system has been 
substituted by a semiflexible exchange system, including the adoption 
of wide bands of intervention. 
In this paper we readdress the issue of decomposition of the real 
interest rate parity, in the spirit of the papers of Frankel and MacArthur 
(1988) and Branson (1988). The role of the integration of market of REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY  119 
goods and factors is highlighted by assessing the behavior of the real 
exchange rate behavior in determining the real interest rate differential 
between Colombia and the us A.
1 
Such real differential has behaved differently from that of the nomi-
nal interest rates due to the fact that the PPP rule has not been maintain-
ed. In fact, the real exchange rate targeting made by the Central Bank 
has changed the rule in several occasions during the period 1976-1993, 
due to the correct perception that the PPP level has also changed dynami-
;ally, as external debt and real growth of the economy have altered their 
path.
2 While the uncovered interest rate differential was favorable to 
Colombia during the period 1977-1982, the commercial component (cor-
-esponding to the real exchange rate effect) was unfavorable to Colom-
bia due to the sharp appreciation of the peso. Important capital outflows 
occurred during such period. In the period 1983-1987 the effects were 
eversed, as the real differential reached 10 percentage points in favor of 
;apital flows towards Colombia. The period 1991-1993 was of great 
volatility in the components of the real interest rate differential, but by the 
;nd of 1993 it had converged to nearly zero differential as the process of 
apertura" consolidated. 
. Uncovered Interest Rate Differential between the Colombian 
Peso and the us Dollar 
Tie simplest version of interest rate parity postulates that financial 
larkets will equilibrate the return on domestic assets / with that of 
areign assets, which is usually measured by the compounding effect 
f the foreign interest rate i* and the actual or expected rate of 
epreciation + e or appreciation - e. This statement is known in the 
nancial literature as the "uncovered interest rate parity condition", 
jmrnarized in equation (l).
3 
1 This decomposition could be traced back to the synthesis made by Dornbusch 
976) of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, based on the long-run PPP, 
id the assets approach, based on short-term capital flows. 
2 See, for example, Echavarrfa and Gaviria (1992). 
3 We shall make abstraction of the effects of residents vs. non-resident taxes. 
Dwever, it should be said that in certain countries and at particular periods they are 
lite important in determining the direction of capital flows. 120 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
i-{?+e)~0 (1) 
Graph 1 illustrates, first, the path of the domestic component i and, 
secondly, that of the external component (f + e), where e corresponds 
to the actual rate of depreciation. (See appendix regarding data and 
sources)
4 Note that, during the period 1976-1982, the domestic compo-
nent was, on average, about 5 percentage points above the external 
component. Graph 2 illustrates the nominal difference between the re-
turn on savings held in Colombian pesos and the return on savings in 
us-dollars, converted to pesos at the actual exchange rate. The positive 
interest difference observed in the period 1976-1982 is consistent with 
the decrease of about US$3.5 billion in the stock of financial assets held 
by the private Colombian sector in USA during such period (Rennhack 
and Mondino, 1989). Such amount of capital inflows represented about 
1.8% of the GDP generated in that period. 
In contrast, during the period 1983-1987, the acceleration of the 
crawling peg-rule, which determined the nominal rate of depreciation, 
turned the nominal differential negative for Colombian savings. In fact, 
such differential reached up to 20 percentage points by the end of 1985 
(see graph 2). This reversion in the sign of the differential with respect 
to the previous period also coincides with a change in the direction of 
the capital flows. It has been documented that in the years 1983-1985 
took place capital outflows estimated at us$4 billion (Rennhack and 
Mondino, 1989; Gomez, 1990).
5 This amount of capital outflows repre-
sented about 3.6% of the GDP generated during the period 1983-1985. 
With the exception of the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988, 
such nominal differential was unfavorable to financial savings in Colom-
bia, reaching extreme values of -10 percentage points by the end of 198 8 
4 In computing the differentials, we have taken into account the compounding effect 
of i and e, which could represent up to 3 percentage points when, for example, the annual 
rate of depreciation was at 40% and the foreign interest rate was 8%, i.e. 
[(1.40* 1.08) - 1 ] - [0.40 + 0.08] = 0.032. 
5 Based on data from the Bank of International Settlements, Gomez (1990) es-
timated capital outflows of nearly us$4.2 billion during the period 1981-88, representing 
about 1.3% of the GDP generated during those years. It is important to mention that such 
capital flows are not necessarily connected with those of drug traffiking, as documented 
by Correa (1984) and Urrutia (1990). However, deregulation of the rigid exchange 
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and -8 percentage points at the beginning of 1990. This situation chan-
ged during 1990, as external interest rates fell and the domestic ones 
escalated. The behavior of the nominal differential could then help 
explaining the lingering of financial deepening indicators, such as M2/GDP 
or M3/GDP, during the second part of the 1980s (Clavijo, 1992b). 
Beginning in 1991, the nominal differential reversed again, as domes-
tic interest rates increased, reaching 39.4% per annum in the third 
quarter, the external interest rates fell to 5.6% and the rate of deprecia-
tion decelerated to 23.5% per annum (Banco de la Republica, 1991). 
The differential registered 9.7 percentage points in the third quarter of 
1991 and climbed up to 19.5 percentage points by the end of 1992. During 
1993, the uncovered interest rate differential was finally reduced to 5-10 
percentage points, as domestic interest rates fell down to 26% per annum. 
In short, it would be difficult to argue that, during the period 1976¬
1993, there has been convergence of Colombian nominal interest rates 
and USA interest rates, adjusted by the actual rate of depreciation of the 
peso against the dollar, as postulated by equation (1). The internal-exter-
nal difference was much higher than 5 percentage points during 1976¬
1983 and turned negative and larger than -5 during 1984-1987. During 
1991-1993, it has been again positive and higher than 5 percentage 
points. In spite of the rigid exchange controls dating from 1967, this 
wide fluctuations of the interest rate differential induced important capi-
tal flows. In fact, it has been documented that the premium of the 
black-market exchange rate is deeply associated with fundamental ma-
cro-variables, among others with the interest rate differential (Ocampo, 
1985; Herrera, 1990). The capital flows have become more evident 
since the opening of the capital account began with the enactment of 
Law 9 of 1991 and its regulation through decrees 57/91, 21/93 y 28/93. 
2. Real Interest Rate Differential: Financial and Commercial 
Components 
Under a crawling-peg system, the real exchange rate is targeted by 
adjusting the nominal rate of depreciation e to close the gap between 
domestic inflation p and the external inflation p*. If the Central Bank 
succeeds in setting the rule e=p-p*, then equation (1) could also be 
interpreted as a rule of real interest rate parity, as shown in equation (2). REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY  123 
rhe components of such real difference appear in graph 3, comparing 
:olombian financial markets with those of the USA. Note that ex post 
•eturn on financial savings in Colombia have fluctuated between 5 and 
15 real percentage points, with peaks at 1984 and 1986, except for 
:hort-term negative returns in 1977, 1979 and 1992. By contrast, the real 
eturn on financial savings in USA has fluctuated only between 3 and 8 
>ercentage points, with peaks in 1981 and 1982, except during short 
>eriods during 1977 and 1980. During 1992 and 1993 the real return has 
ieen close to zero. 
(i-p)-{t-p*) = r-r*~Q (2) 
Graph 4 illustrates the difference in real returns in Colombia and in 
ISA, where it is notorious its volatility. For instance, such difference 
;ached -10 percentage points during mid 1977, +10 points in 1984 and 
986, and -6 points again in 1992. However, in contrast with the behav-
>r of the uncovered interest rate parity, here the real difference has 
onverged to the range (0, +5) during 1993, where strong capital flows 
tiould not be taking place. 
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The contrast between the uncovered interest rate differential, which 
do not exhibit convergence towards zero, and the real difference, which 
does converge to zero, is explained by the fact that the criteria 
e =p -p* did not hold for the Colombian peso during the period 1990¬
93. Right at the outset of the liberalization program in 1990, the Colom-
bian Central Bank accelerated e, which later spilled into higher inflation 
and led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate with respect to the 
1990 level. 
This conclusion could, nevertheless, be easily altered if such differ-
entials are computed based on proxies for the expected rate of deprecia-
tion of the peso against the dollar, as we shall illustrate it later. For the 
moment, it is worth concentrating in the decomposition of this differen-
ce in real returns. 
2 A. Decomposition of the Real Interest Rate Differential 
When taking into account the futures market of a given currency, it 
becomes possible to decompose the real difference of interest rates 
between its financial, commercial and currency risk factors, as shown in REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY  125 
equation (3), following Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Branson 
;i988). Such expression is just a reaccommodation of terms previously 
ihown in (2), only that we now have added the currency discount of the 
rational currency in the futures market/vis-á-vis the expected rate of 
iepreciation e. 
Real 
Parity Bonds Goods Currency 
r - r* = (( - i*-f) + (e-p+ p*) + if- e) (3) 
This expression portraits the real interest rate difference as deter-
nined by: 1) a difference of nominal interest rates covered by the 
utures currency market (i.e. the covered interest parity), which will be 
ddressed as the bonds effect; 2) a difference in the prices of traded 
oods and services, which is determined by the real exchange rate, 
/hich is here referred to as the goods effect; and 3) a differential which 
; associated to the local currency risk. 
Given the fact that the Colombian peso is not traded in the money 
tarkets due to its condition of "weak" currency, we do not have data for 
te discount/shown in equation (3). Some newly industrialized coun-
ies, such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapur and Mexico, have devel-
ped a market of futures for their currencies. This could help to a better 
inctioning of their financial markets. For instance, Mexico exhibited a 
avered interest rate differential of nearly -17 points, with respect to the 
uro-bond market, during 1982-1987. In spite of strict exchange con-
ols, Mexico experienced massive capital outflows during the interna-
anal debt crises (see Frankel and MacArthur, 1988). 
Provided that/=0 for Colombia, equation (3) could be altered to 
ke the form shown in (4).
6 This implies that the currency effect disap-
;ars from the expression and that the bonds effect is really uncovered, 
s we shall see, in some cases e will take values referred to the actual 
te of depreciation (although in different markets) and in other cases it 
ill refer to the expected rate of depreciation + e or appreciation - e 
>mputed both from a static and a dynamic point of view. 
6 Note that unless we define different values for e in each component, the bond and 
: goods effects will mirror each other. This assumption will be altered later. 128 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
closing the RER gap. Note, in graph 6, the convergence of the lines 
showing the actual rate of depreciation and the expected rate required to 
attain the 1975 RER goal. During the period 1987-1989, the domestic 
rate of inflation was slightly reduced and the nominal rate of deprecia-
tion maintained in the 25-30% annual range. This caused the expected 
rate of depreciation to be reduced from 50% at the end of 1986 to only 
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However, due to the high levels of external indebtedness and to the 
need of promoting nonprimary goods exports, the Central Bank contin-
ued to pursue an active RER targeting. We have estimated that, by the 
end of 1989, the nominal rate of depreciation of the peso surpassed in 
nearly 10 percentage points the rate required to maintain an static equili-
brium of the RER. Although such policy did permit in the 1987-1989 
period a real depreciation of nearly 12 points with respect to the 1975 
RER level, its long-term effect on the inflation rate was costly and this 
strategy postponed badly needed structural changes leading to the ope-
ning of the economy. 
An alternative measurement of the expected rate of depreciation 
arises when one considers the need of implementing structural changes REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY  129 
and the sustainability of the RER, for example with respect to the 1975 
level
7. The implicit (dynamic) equilibrium of the RER could then be 
:aken as the one that prevailed during 1986 and the expected rate of 
depreciation as the one required to close the gap between domestic and 
;xternal CPI inflation from then onwards. Note, in graph 6, that the 
tctual rate of depreciation followed very closely this (dynamic) expec-
ations, beginning in mid-1990 with the opening of the economy. The 
ictive real exchange rate targeting pursued a goal of maintaining 12 
>ercentage points of real depreciation with respect to the RER of 1975. 
It is important to detail two episodes of "misalignment" of the RER 
vith respect to the 1986 level. The first one occurred in 1990, when a 
ominal depreciation of 32% per annum was adopted as a precautionary 
xchange policy to counterbalance the expected increase of imports due 
3 the abolition of quantitative restrictions and the rapid reduction of 
nport tariffs. We have estimated, ex post, that the nominal rate of 
epreciation could have been about 10 percentage points lower, due to 
te fact that imports did not pick-up as expected and that the internatio-
al reserves precautionary component was actually never needed. As a 
suit of the acceleration of the nominal rate of depreciation, Colombian 
iflation accelerated, reaching nearly 32% per annum in late 1990. 
The second episode of "misalignment" took place in mid-1991, 
hen a de facto nominal appreciation of nearly 10% was adopted by 
eans of introducing a floor of 12.5% discount on the official exchange 
te set by the Central Bank. By the end of 1992, we have estimated that 
e nominal rate of depreciation required to maintain the RER of 1986 
as around 10%, while the actual rate was running at 4.6% per annum, 
lis RER appreciation, with respect to the level of 1986, prevailed 
ring 1993 as the required nominal depreciation was around 19.5%, 
lile the actual rate was only 11%. Note, however, that such nominal 
preciation still granted 5 percentage points of depreciation with res-
et to the parity held in 1975 (the static equilibrium). 
How are these results to be compared with the multilateral-RER 
mputed by the Colombian Central Bank, in which trade and currency 
7 There exists at least another proxy for the expected rate of depreciation, indeed 
y popular among Colombian entrepreneurs, consisting in annualizing the monthly rate 
depreciation. Although it is often argued that this alternative has the advantage of 
ing "forward looking" elements in it, we consider that it lacks an economic anchor, as 
other alternatives do. 130 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
movements of about 18 countries are taken into account? By the end 
of 1993, the multilateral-RER index was in the range 102-104, where 
1986= 100, irrespectively of using CPI'S, whole-sale prices or wages 
indices as deflators. This means that a 4% real depreciation was still 
held with respect to our "dynamic equilibrium" at the end of 1993, 
result which is basically explained by the real depreciation of the dollar 
with respect to other hard-currencies. 
In fact, it has been estimated that the us-dollar was about 30% 
undervalued with respect to its equilibrium rate of the early 1970s 
against a basket of other hard-currencies, which obviously helped de-
preciate the peso with respect to other hard-currencies, as the Central 
Bank adopted a rule of pegging the peso to the us-dollar. In consequen-
ce, the multilateral-RER reveals a higher depreciation than the one com-
puted only against the dollar. Additionally, this effect was reinforced by 
a trend of real appreciation of most Latin American currencies during 
the early 1990s (Calvo etal, 1993). 
These alternatives of expected rates of depreciation generate diffe-
rent goods and bonds effects on the real interest rate differential. For 
instance, medium-term decisions could consider the expected rate of 
depreciation as the rate required to close the RER with respect to the 
1986 level, while short-term decisions could consider the actual rate of 
depreciation observed in the exchange houses. The result of this hypo-
thetical exercise is depicted in graph 7, where it can be observed that the 
real interest rate differential would have been 5 percentage points in 
favor of Colombia during 1992, but it would have reached 10 points 
during 1993. This outcome is quite different from the parity observed 
when the real interest rate differential was computed using the actual 
rate of nominal depreciation. 
Graph 8 compares the real interest rate decomposition when 
actual and expected rates of depreciation are used. The higher real 
differential obtained when using expected rates of depreciation could be 
interpreted as a result of having a lower current account deficit and a 
more depreciated RER, given the assumption that private agents could 
have expected no gap against the RER level of 1986. During the first 
quarter of 1993, this effect would have been reinforced by a higher bond 
effect, that would have induced more capital inflows into Colombia. 
However, this effect would have ceased by the end of the year. REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY 13 1 
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3. Conclusions 
We have concentrated our analysis in the concept of real interest rate 
differential and its decomposition between its bond effect (i.e. uncovered 
interest rate differential) and its goods effect (i.e. the RER effect). We have 
also focused on the role of exchange rate expectations by considering 
different alternatives of static and dynamic exchange rate equilibriums 
for the Colombian peso during the period 1976-1993. 
Using simple computations of interest rate differentials between 
Colombia and USA, it has been shown that uncovered interest rate differ-
entials are not a good approximation to the behavior of real interest 
rates differentials due to the fact that "purchasing power parity" has not 
been held in several years during such period, particularly in 1977¬
1978, 1983-1987 and again in 1991-1993. 
When the decomposition of such real differential was performed, it was 
found that the bonds effect (or the uncovered interest rate) was favorable to 
capital inflows into Colombia for up to 10 percentage points during the 
period 1977-1978, while the goods effect (or the RER) was appreciated 
in about 20 percentage points. The net result was a differential of about 
10 points against the peso, hence inducing capital flows out of Colombia. 
In the period 1983-1987 there was a reversal of effects as the goods 
effect turned positive by about 25 points (indicating a real depreciation 
of the peso against the dollar) and the bonds effect turned negative by 
about 20 points (showing unfavorable conditions for financial savings 
in Colombia). In consequence, the real interest rate differential was 
around 5 percentage points in favor of Colombia during this period. 
More recently, during the period 1991-1993, such real differential 
fluctuated between -5 and +5, and experienced another reversion of 
effects. The RER has appreciated with respect to the 1990 level and the 
uncovered interest rate turned highly positive, attracting short-term ca-
pitals into Colombia. These effects have balanced each other and the ex 
post differential have converged to almost zero by the end of 1993. 
Finally, we explained how the interpretation of the bonds and goods 
effect could be drastically altered by assuming different proxies for the 
expected rate of depreciation. For example, if exchange rate expecta-
tions corresponded to the rate that would have close the gap with res-
pect to the 1986-RER level, private agents would have had incentives to 
arbitrage capital flows by moving into Colombian pesos. REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY 133 
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